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IN

ILLICIT

FORFEITURE;

EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL SEARCH INADMISSIBLE IN FORFEITURE
PROCEEDING;

IMPOUNDMENT OF AUTOMOBILE WITHOUT WARRANT IN

ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES INVALIDATES

RELATED INVENTORY SEARCH.-In re Forfeiture of the Following Described Vehicle, 1972 Porsche 2 Dr., '74 Florida License Tag ID
91788 VIN #9111200334, 307 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Robert Higgins, Jr., was arrested in a police raid at another person's
residence and charged with possession of cocaine and marijuana. His
car, which had been legally parked on the street nearby, was towed
away and stored for safekeeping. This procedure was allegedly the
policy of the Dade County Public Safety Department. A warrantless
search of the automobile for inventory purposes was made at the scene
of the arrest. Two packets of "PCP" (phencyclidine), a controlled
drug, were discovered underneath a seat.'
Subsequently, the state filed a petition for a rule to show cause why
the automobile should not be forfeited to the use of or sale by the
Dade County authorities under sections 893.12(2) and 893.12(5) of the
Florida Statutes.2 These provisions authorize forfeiture to the state of

1. In re Forfeiture of the Following Described Vehicle, 1972 Porsche 2 Dr., '74 Florida
License Tag ID 91788 VIN #9111200334, 307 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
FLA. STAT. § 893.03(3)(a) (1973) names phencyclidine as a controlled substance. According to the statute, phencyclidine has "a depressant effect on the nervous system,"
FLA. STAT. § 893.03(3)(a) (1973), and "may lead to moderate or low physical dependence
or high psychological dependence." FLA. STAT. § 893.03(3) (1973).
2. The case was decided under the forfeiture statute before it was amended in 1974.
The relevant portion of FLA. STAT. § 893.12(2) (1973) provided:
Any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft which has been or is being used in violation of any
provision of this chapter or in, upon, or by means of which any violation of this
chapter has taken or is taking place may be seized and forfeited to the state or
other jurisdiction responsible for the seizure.
FLA. STAT. § 893.12(2) (Supp. 1974) provides:
Any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft which has been or is being used in violation of any
provision of this chapter or in, upon, or by means of which any violation of this
chapter has taken or is taking place may be seized and forfeited as provided by the
Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act.
Before its repeal, the relevant portion of FLA. STAT. § 893.12(5) (1973) (brackets in original)
provided:
The state attorney within whose jurisdiction the vessel, vehicle, or aircraft has
been seized because of its use or attempted use in violation of any provision of this
chapter shall proceed against the vessel, vehicle, or aircraft by rule to show cause in
the court having jurisdiction of the offense, and have it forfeited to the use of or
the sale by the law enforcement agency making the seizure on producing due proof
that the [vessel,] vehicle, [or aircraft] was being used in violation of the provisions
of this section.
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vehicles used in violation of state drug abuse statutes.3 After a hearing
on the petition, the trial judge granted Higgins' motion to dismiss the
rule, stating that in his opinion the statute was intended to require
vehicle forfeiture only if "the vehicle is being used to further a drug
operation, ' ' 4 and thus did not authorize vehicle forfeiture simply because the owner had been arrested for possessing illegal drugs.
The Third District Court of Appeal, in an opinion written by
Judge Hendry, affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The district
court voiced general agreement with the idea that "forfeiture of an
automobile is a drastic remedy in the absence of a nexus between the
illegal drugs found in the car and the furtherance of an illegal drug
'operation,' even though a strict reading of the language contained in
Section 893.12(2) would seem to permit a forfeiture for 'any violation
of this chapter.' "5 However, the court expressly declined to rest its
decision on this point, 6 finding another ground conclusive. It held the
seizure and search of the car were unjustified because the state failed to
show the presence of probable cause and exigent circumstances that
might obviate the need for a warrant.7 In addition, the court rejected
the state's contention that the impoundment, search, and inventory
could be justified as a routine police procedure designed to protect the

The Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41-.44 (Supp.
1974), was enacted to provide uniform standards and procedures for vehicle forfeitures.
Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-385, Preamble. Although the Act repealed FLA. STAT. § 893.12(5)
(1973), it contains a provision nearly identical to the repealed section. See FLA. STAT.
§ 943.44(l) (Supp. 1974).
The Act does, however, define "violation" much more specifically than § 893.12(2).
Section 943.41(2)(a) includes within the definition of contraband "[a]ny controlled substance as defined in chapter 893." Section 943.42 makes it unlawful:
(1) To transport, carry, or convey any contraband article in, upon, or by means of
any vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft.
(2) To conceal or possess any contraband article in or upon any vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft.
(3) To use any vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft to facilitate the transportation,
carriage, conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter, exchange or giving away of any contraband article.
Section 943.43 provides that any vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft used in violation of
§ 943.42 "shall be seized and may be forfeited."
3. The Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, FLA. STAT.
§§ 893.01-.15 (1973), was enacted in 1973 to bring the state's drug abuse laws into substantial conformance with the Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970). Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-331, Preamble. The federal statutory counterpart to § 893.12 is 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1970).
4. Quoted in 307 So. 2d at 452.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 452-53.
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police against potential claims of theft of the car or loose items within
8
the car.
The decision in 1972 Porsche touches upon three significant questions in the areas of statutory forfeitures and related searches and
seizures: what degree of drug offense will support forfeiture of a
vehicle?; may contraband drugs seized during an illegal vehicle search
be used as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding?; and may warrantless
impoundment and inventory search of a vehicle be made without
demonstrating an exception to the warrant requirement?
What Degree of Drug Offense Will Support Forfeiture
of a Vehicle?
The state contended in 1972 Porsche that because illegal drugs
were found in the car it was obviously being used in violation of the
drug abuse law and was subject to forfeiture. The court favored
Higgins' argument that the forfeiture statute reflects a legislative intent
to curb illegal drug operations, not simple possession of drugs. The
court stated, "In our view, forfeiture statutes are intended to apply to
those individuals who are 'significantly involved in a criminal enterprise.' "9
The language quoted by the district court was lifted out of context
from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in United States v.
United States Coin & Currency.'0 That case dealt in part with the
question of whether a person can be divested of ownership of his property by forfeiture when he himself is innocent of any wrongdoing. The
dicta of the 1972 Porsche court went beyond this." It regarded the
8. Id. at 453.
9. Id. at 452, quoting United States v. United States Coin SeCurrency, 401 U.S. 715,
721-22 (1971). The district court's use of the plural ("forfeiture statutes") in this context
indicates the court did not limit its reasoning solely to the interpretation of the statute
in question. The same viewpoint could be applied to other forfeiture provisions, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 206.205 (1973) (vehicles and boats used in the transportation of untaxed
motor fuel); FLA. STAT. §§ 562.27(6), .35 (1973) (conveyances used in transporting illicit
alcohol, its raw materials, or distilling equipment); FLA. STAT. § 849.36(1) (1973) (vessels
and vehicles used to transport lottery tickets or other gambling paraphernalia).
10. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
11. Even if the 1972 Porsche court had limited itself to ruling that an innocent owner
is not subject to the penalty of forfeiture, its reliance on Coin & Currency would still be
ill-founded. The broad language of that case was severely restricted by the Court in
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). That case involved the
seizure by Puerto Rican authorities of a pleasure yacht owned by a leasing company that
had no knowledge of its lessee's criminal activity on board the vessel-the possession of a
single marijuana cigarette. In Calero.Toledo, Mr. Justice Brennan, for the majority, read
Coin & Currency as having involved only statutory interpretation, and not the constitutional issue of whether forfeiture of an innocent person's property constitutes a "taking"
of that property without due process of law. "Thus, Coin & Currency did not overrule
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Florida statute as inapplicable not only to innocent owners, but also to
vehicle owners who are guilty of minor violations of drug laws. 12 The
prior decisions that sustained application to innocents of forfeiture statutes ... not limited
in application to persons 'significantly involved in a criminal enterprise.' " 416 U.S. at 688.
The Court in Calero-Toledo held that forfeiture statutes are not unconstitutional merely
because they are applied to an innocent person's property. Further, it was felt that the
extended reach of the Puerto Rican statute was buttressed by an important and legitimate
governmental interest. "To the extent that such forfeiture provisions are applied to
lessors, bailors, or secured creditors who are innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation may
have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their property." Id. at 687-88.
Nevertheless, the Court did not hold that the owner's innocence could never be a
constitutional defense to a forfeiture proceeding. Two possible exceptions were noted.
The first was if the property has been stolen or "borrowed" without permission and used
to convey contraband. The Court reasoned "that it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken
from him without his privity or consent." Id. at 689. FLA. STAT. § 943.43 (Supp. 1974)
specifically prescribes that, in such circumstances as are outlined in the Court's opinion,
forfeiture shall not apply:
No vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft . . . shall be forfeited under the provisions of
ss. 943.41-943.44, unless the owner or person legally in charge of such vessel, motor
vehicle, or aircraft was at the time of the alleged illegal act a consenting party or
privy thereto. No vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft shall be forfeited . . . by reason
of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been committed or
omitted by any person other than such owner while such vessel, motor vehicle, or
aircraft was unlawfully in the possession of a person who acquired possession thereof
in violation of the criminal laws of this state or any political subdivision thereof,
any other state, or the United States.
The Calero-Toledo Court recognized a second possible exception for "an owner who
prove[s] not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but
also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed
use of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that
forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive." 416 U.S. at 689-90
(footnote omitted). Given the facts of the Calero-Toledo case, however, it is not easy to
hypothesize situations in which this condition could be met. A yacht leasing company may
have means by which to guard against the use of its property in a smuggling operation,
but what possible steps could it take to satisfy itself that a lessee was not in possession of
a minute quantity of marijuana? The opinion suggests a burden of due care that may be
well-nigh impossible to meet. Justice Douglas, in dissent, argued for a less harsh approach: "I, therefore, would remand the case to the three-judge court for findings as to
the innocence of the lessor of the yacht-whether the illegal use was of such magnitude
or notoriety that the owner cannot be found faultless in remaining ignorant of its occurrence." Id. at 694.
12. In Grimm v. State, 305 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974), the court expressed a diametrically opposed view of FLA. STAT. § 893.12(2) (1973). The result in
Grimm graphically illustrates the draconian consequence of a strict-constructionist approach to this statute. The appellant and three companions, while parked near a beach,
aroused the suspicion of a police officer. Upon coming closer, the officer detected the
aroma of marijuana. The occupants of the car were arrested. One passenger had 13
grams of marijuana, a felony quantity, stowed in a sock. He received a $100 fine and a
year's unsupervised probation. Approximately one gram of marijuana was found in the
ashtray of the car. Grimm, the owner, forfeited his new $4000 Fiat to the State of Florida.
The court was not sympathetic. It found that "[t]he statutory language is clear," and that
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court apparently felt that the purpose of forfeiture is to provide an additional deterrent to trafficking in substantial quantities of contraband. 1. The opinion, however, is unclear as to when the drug law violation becomes too slight to warrant forfeiture, i.e. whether it applies
only to major smuggling and marketing schemes or would reach the
business of the small-time dealer. At the least, the court has indicated
that it does not feel compelled by the broad wording of the statute to
effect a forfeiture for every violation of the drug laws, no matter how
insubstantial. Florida courts have traditionally disfavored statutory
forfeitures, and have endeavored to limit their application. 1'4 The result
in 1972 Porsche is consistent with that tendency.
"the public policy established by the legislature has been violated and the sanction designated by that body must perforce be invoked.' 305 So. 2d at 253. "While the law in relation to the facts of this case is harsh, it is the law. Appellant argues that it was the
legislative intent to only confiscate vehicles of those 'trafficking' in illegal drugs, but the
statute ... is unambiguous." Id. (McCord, J., specially concurring).
The Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41-.44 (Supp.
1974), is clearer still. See note 2 supra.
13. A plausible argument could be made that the Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970), after which the Florida act was
modeled, had the principal purpose of cracking down on large scale trafficking in drugs,
not individual possession, and that the Florida law is meant to reach the same end. The
recommendation of the President's Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse
was that the law be oriented toward rehabilitation of the individual drug abuser, but
that "[t]he illegal traffic in drugs should be attacked with the full power of the Federal
Government. The price for participation in this traffic should be prohibitive. It should
be made too dangerous to be attractive." H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
(1970), 3 U.S. COnE CONG. & Ao. NEWs 4575 (1970). On the other hand, federal courts
have decided that "it is impossible to conclude that Congress was concerned only with
large scale trading in narcotics. The intent is clearly expressed to make unlawful (and
therefore subject to forfeiture) the use of any vehicle for transporting, concealing or
possessing any contraband article.
...
United States v. One 1971 Porsche Coupe Auto.,
V.I. No. 9111100355, 364 F. Supp. 745, 749 (E.D. Pa. 1973); accord, United States v. One
1972 Datsun, Vehicle ID. No. LB1100355950, 378 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 (D.N.H. 1974).
14. Referring to the forfeiture provision in the state's alcoholic beverage laws, the
Florida Supreme Court said, "Forfeitures are not favored in law or equity and a statute
authorizing the same must by the courts be strictly construed." General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. State, 11 So. 2d 482, 484 (Fla. 1943). In the GMAC case the court refused to infer
from the statute a legislative intent to forfeit the property of an innocent conditional
seller of a car. Today an innocent lienholder's interests are protected from forfeiture
under FLA. STAT. § 943.44(1) (Supp. 1974). See also Boyle v. State, 47 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1950),
in which the doctrine of strictly construing forfeiture statutes led to the ruling that money
seized from a crap table during a gambling raid did not fall under the statutory definition of "property" that could be forfeited under Fla. Laws 1895, ch. 4373, § 4. That provision was amended in 1953 to make explicit the legislative intent that money used as a
prize or a stake in a gambling operation is subject to forfeiture. Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28088
(now FLA. STAT. § 849.12 (1973)). Subsequent to the GMAC and Boyle decisions, the
legislature, in an apparent effort to make the courts take a harder line on at least some
forfeitures, enacted FLA. STAT. § 562.408 (1973) as an addition to an existing forfeiture
statute:

1975]

CASE COMMENTS

Whatever the validity of its interpretation of the statute, the court's
conclusion at least accords with a notion of fairness. The evil effects of
too literal a reading of statutes of this sort have been amply demonstrated. 15 To declare the forfeiture of a valuable automobile for simple
possession of a sole marijuana cigarette, for example, is to impose a
penalty that appears wholly out of proportion to the severity of the offense. Seizures and forfeitures are justifiable, if at all, only as means to
discourage the use of vehicles in the movement or sale of substantial
amounts of contraband.

1

6

May ContrabandDrugs Seized Duringan Illegal Vehicle Search
Be Used as Evidence in a ForfeitureProceeding?
The court of appeal's decision in 1972 Porsche rested on a finding
that the packets of drugs had been obtained by a search that violated
the fourth amendment. The drugs were therefore suppressed under the
exclusionary rule.' 7 Since the illegal use of the automobile could not
It is deemed by the legislature that this law is necessary for the more efficient and
proper enforcement of the statutes and laws of this state prohibiting the manufacture of or traffic in illicit moonshine whiskey and a lawful exercise of the police
power of the state for the protection of the public welfare, health, safety and morals
of the people of the state. All the provisions of this law shall be liberally construed
for the accomplishment of these purposes.
See also FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41-.44 (Supp. 1974); note 2 supra. Against this backround,
1972 Porsche could be viewed as one more skirmish between the legislature and the
state's judiciary in a continuing battle over the wisdom of statutory forfeitures.
15. Comment, Automobile Forfeiture Under Article 725d-Texas Style, 14 S. TEX. L.J.
193 (1973), quotes the following from a report of the Texas Legislature:
In the eight month period from October, 1971, to June, 1972, eighty-four vehicles were seized under the authority of the State of Texas, an average of one every
three days.
L. B. Yates lost his 1961 Chevrolet for one partially smoked marijuana cigarette.
W. F. Sinclair lost his 1968 Plymouth for one marijuana cigarette. W. F. Griffin lost
his 1964 Volkswagen for the equivalent of less than one half of one marijuana
cigarette. M. A. Beavers lost his 1964 Chevrolet for three marijuana cigarettes.
J. S. Coker lost his 1968 Volkswagen bus for the equivalent of five marijuana
cigarettes. S. Carmichael lost his 1969 Corvette for the equivalent of eight marijuana cigarettes. And the State of Texas moved in all its majesty to seize and
forfeit W. L. Landrum's 1970 Honda motorcycle because he rode it while carrying
the equivalent of ten marijuana cigarettes.
Id. (footnote omitted).
16. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663 (1974), made a similar observation: "If the yacht had been notoriously used
in smuggling drugs, those who claim forfeiture might have equity on their side. But no
such showing was made; and so far as we know only one marihuana cigarette was found
on the yacht. We deal here with trivia where harsh judge-made law should be tempered
with justice." Id. at 693.
17. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Florida has written the exclusionary rule into its constitution. Like the fourth amendment, FLA. CONSr. art. I, § 12 declares the right to be free from unreasonable searches
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be demonstrated without the excluded evidence, Higgins was entitled
to retain ownership of his car.
8
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania1
supports the court's
holding on this point. The United States Supreme Court there ruled
that the exclusionary rule applies in a forfeiture proceeding even
though such a proceeding traditionally has been treated as a civil in
rem action. 9 In One 1958 Plymouth, the Court stated that a forfeiture
proceeding "is quasi-criminal in character. Its object, like a criminal
proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the
law."20 Given this interpretation of the nature of forfeitures, it was
clear to the Court that the exclusionary rule was applicable to forfeiture proceedings. "It would be anomalous indeed, under these circumstances, to hold that in the criminal proceeding the illegally seized
evidence is excludable, while in the forfeiture proceeding, requiring
the determination that the criminal law has been violated, the same
evidence would be admissible. '" 21 Since the requisite criminal use often
cannot be established without recourse to the tainted evidence, the
property sought to be forfeited may be returned to the owner.22
and seizures. It further provides that "[a]rticles or information obtained in violation of
this right shall not be admissible in evidence."
18. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
19. Summaries of the historical development and procedural treatment of forfeitures
can be found in Note, Due Process in Automobile Forfeiture Proceedings, 3 U. BALT. L.
REv. 270 (1974); Comment, Rendering Illegal Behavior Unprofitable: Vehicle Forfeiture
Under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 471 (1974-1975).
20. 380 U.S. at 700. In the past, Florida has treated forfeitures as civil actions. This
doctrine led the Florida Supreme Court to hold that, under res judicata principles, the
acquittal of the owner of a car in a criminal trial for alleged violation of the alcoholic
beverage laws has no bearing on a proceeding for forfeiture of the car involving the
same set of facts. State v. Dubose, 11 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1943). The same conclusion has
been reached by the United States Supreme Court. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One
Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886), ruled that acquittal in a criminal trial is a
bar to a forfeiture proceeding. The case was distinguished in Emerald Cut Stones, 409
U.S. at 235 n.5, and probably has little validity today.
A related issue is whether forfeiture of property and a conviction of the owner based
on identical factual grounds constitute double jeopardy. Such claims have had scant
success because of the theory that forfeiture is a civil, not a criminal, sanction, and that
the two actions often involve differing issues and standards of proof. See One Lot Emerald
Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, supra; United States v. One (1) 1969 Buick Riviera
Auto., 493 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Mendoza, 473 F.2d 692 (5th Cir.
1972). The conclusion to be drawn from comparing Emerald Cut Stones with 1958
Plymouth is that, while forfeiture proceedings are considered criminal in nature for
purposes of the exclusionary rule, they are generally to be treated as civil actions.
21. 380 U.S. at 701 (footnote omitted).
22. It should be noted that 1958 Plymouth does not stand for the proposition that all
forms of contraband are immune from confiscation and must be returned to the owner if
illegally obtained by the authorities. The Court's opinion drew a distinction between
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May WarrantlessImpoundment and Inventory Search of a
Vehicle Be Made Without Demonstratingan
Exception to the Warrant Requirement?
In light of 1958 Plymouth, it is in no way surprising that the district court ruled invalid the attempted forfeiture of Higgins' car, since
it was grounded on the fruits of an improper search. What is significant, however, is the initial finding that an illegal search had taken
place. The court's terse holding on this point read simply:
The state has offered nothing to substantiate either that the police
had probable cause to believe that contraband was in the vehicle or
that exigent circumstances existed at the time of the search. Compare, United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974).
At the hearing in the trial court, the state relied simply on the
policy of the Dade County Public Safety Department. It was contended that the vehicle was inventoried, searched, and towed as a
matter of "self-protection" since the car was not located at the
owner's, Higgins', residence and therefore potentially was subject to
a claim that either the car or loose articles lying therein were taken.
We find such a rationale legally insufficient. 23
Absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, the only basis for
upholding the search in the instant case was the emerging inventory
search doctrine. The court's ambiguous holding on that doctrine is
susceptible to two interpretations. It may be read as (1) rejecting the
notion that an inventory search of a vehicle lawfully impounded may
be conducted without a warrant; or (2) requiring the state to demonstrate the necessity of the underlying warrantless impoundment in
order to apply the inventory search "exception" to the warrant requirement.
The first interpretation implies a sweeping change in Florida law,
and thus seems unwarranted in light of the court's failure to discuss
extensive case law validating warrantless inventory searches of vehicles
contraband per se and derivative contraband. Id. at 698-700. The former is any item the
possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime. Controlled drugs, moonshine
whiskey, and the like fall into this category. These may be forfeited regardless of the
legality of the search and seizure. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1951);
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948). Returning such objects to their
owner would not only be against public policy, but would again subject the owner to
possibile criminal penalties for their possession. Derivative contraband consists of items
which are not in themselves illegal to possess, but which can be seized if used in violation
of the law. Typical of these are vehicles used to transport prohibited goods. In the case
of derivative contraband, public policy would not prohibit return of the property to its
original owner.
23. 307 So. 2d at 453.
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lawfully in police custody. The established policy of most law enforcement agencies in Florida is that when a suspect's vehicle has been impounded, it shall be searched and a complete inventory taken of all
items found within it. The reasons for such a search are twofold. First,
the inventory is conducted to safeguard the owner's possessions from
theft or damage. Secondly, the search and inventory serve to protect
the law enforcement agency or a garage owner with whom the car is
left from false claims by the owner of loss or destruction of his property while it is in official custody. 24 Recent decisions of Florida district
courts2 5 have upheld routine inventory searches made without a war24. See 1973 FLA. Ar'y GEN. Op. 073-43, at 3, quoting Heffley v. State, 423 P.2d 666
(Nev. 1967); note 27 infra.
25. State v. Cash, 275 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Galloway, 266
So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Urquhart v. State, 261 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied, 266 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1972); State v. Ruggles, 245 So. 2d 692
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Godbee v. State, 224 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1969). Each of these cases assumed expressly or by implication that the vehicle was lawfully in police custody at the time of the inventory. For example, the leading case in the
area, Godbee, only dealt with the question of "whether a search may be made, without a
warrant, for the sole purpose of making an 'inventory' of the contents of an automobile
in the lawful possession of police officers after the owner thereof has been lawfully placed
under arrest, and when such search is not incidental to the arrest." 224 So. 2d at 442
(emphasis added; footnote omitted).
The constitutional validity of warrantless inventory searches has apparently been
endorsed by the United States Supreme Court, albeit not in a straightforward manner.
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), concerned the search of a car being held as
evidence pursuant to a California forfeiture statute. A 5-4 majority ruled the search constitutional. "It would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain the car
in their custody for such a length of time, had no right, even for their own protection,
to search it." Id. at 61-62. Cooper, however, assumed the initial seizure was legal. As the
Supreme Court subsequently noted in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971):
In Cooper, the seizure of the petitioner's car was mandated by California statute,
and its legality was not questioned. The case stands for the proposition that, given
an unquestionably legal seizure, there are special circumstances that may validate a
subsequent warrantless search.
Id. at 464 n.21 (emphasis added).
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), a per curiam opinion, upheld a conviction gained on the basis of a registration card that fell within the plain view of the
officer as he was engaged in rolling up the windows of an impounded car after it began
to rain. Although the officer had gone to the car to conduct an inventory, his search was
complete at the time he noticed the card. The Court noted, "The admissibility of evidence
found as a result of a search under the police regulation is not presented by this case ...
[T]he discovery of the card was not the result of a search of the car, but of a measure
taken to protect the car while it was in police custody." Id. at 236. In a brief concurrence,
Justice Douglas stressed that the car was lawfully in police possession, and the evidence
was not discovered in an inventory search, but was found accidentally during the performance of the police duty to protect the car. Id. at 236-37.
In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), the police entered the trunk of the
defendant's car according to what was described as standard procedure of the police department. The defendant, an off-duty policeman, had been injured in an accident involving the car, which was towed to a garage. The purported purpose of the warrantless search
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rant, as opposed to warrantless searches which are exploratory in nature. Those decisions have allowed liberal use in criminal trials of
incriminating evidence uncovered during such inventories. The apparent governing rationale of holding warrantless inventory searches
valid is that they are "reasonable" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, 26 because they are undertaken to protect the dual interests
of the owner and the police. 27 On the other hand, a warrantless exploratory search or "fishing expedition," motivated by the intent to
find contraband or evidence, is unconstitutional even if conducted
pursuant to a lawful impoundment.

28

If the 1972 Porsche court's opinion is read to mean the impoundment (rather than the related inventory) was unjustified, the forewas to retrieve the policeman's service revolver believed to be in the car, and thereby
prevent it from falling into the wrong hands. Incriminating evidence of a murder was
found in the trunk. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a five-man majority, noted, "The
police did not have actual, physical custody of the vehicle .... but the vehicle had been
towed . .. at the officers' directions. . . . [L]ike an obviously abandoned vehicle, it represented a nuisance, and there is no suggestion in the record that the officers' action in
exercising control over it by having it towed away was unwarranted either in terms of
state law or sound police procedure." Id. at 446-47.
Justice Rehnquist concluded, "Where, as here, the trunk of an automobile, which the
officer reasonably believed to contain a gun, was vulnerable to intrusion by vandals, we
hold that the search was not 'unreasonable' .... " Id. at 448.
26. But see 1973 FLA. ATr'Y GEN. OP. 073-43, which suggests "an inventory is not a
search in the constitutional sense of the word." Id. at 4. The same conclusion was reached
in State v. Wallen, 173 N.W.2d 372 (Neb.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912 (1970), and People
v. Sullivan, 272 N.E.2d 464 (N.Y. 1971). The logic of Wallen and Sullivan was criticized
in United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 471-72 (8th Cir. 1973).
27. In Godbee v. State, 224 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969), the court stated
that the police were
duty bound, under routine police procedures, to inventory the car and its contents
both for the preservation thereof and to insulate themselves and the garage owner
acting under their direction from possible responsibility in the event of theft or
destruction. Gaining access to the interior of the car and making inventory of its
contents for this purpose was not, in our view, an unreasonable "search" in violation
of any constitutional prohibition.
Id. at 443.
28. In the leading Florida case of Godbee v. State, 224 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1969), the court stressed that it would uphold an inventory only "when the totality
of circumstances show such 'inventory' to be otherwise reasonable and prudent, and when
it is in no way an exploratory search predicated upon a suspicision or subterfuge." Id. at
443 (footnote omitted); accord, 1973 FLA. Arr'y GEN. OP. 073-43, at 4-5. Similarly, State v.
Volk, 291 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), held that evidence turned up by an
inventory following a "pretextual" impoundment that was not in accordance with
standard procedures is inadmissible; accord, United States v. Ducker, 491 F.2d 1190, 1192
(5th Cir. 1974).
In O'Berry v. Wainwright, 394 F. Supp. 591 (S.D. Fla. 1975), the state argued that
a warrantless exploratory search of an impounded vehicle was permissible under the
automobile exception, the plain view doctrine, and as a search incident to arrest. The
federal district court rejected each of those contentions.
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going principles would not be drastically affected; inventories that are
made pursuant to valid impoundments and that are conducted for
protective purposes would be untouched. The conclusion that it was
the impropriety of the seizure, and not the inventory search per se,
that led the 1972 Porsche court to exclude the fruits of the search is
suggested by the fact that the only case cited as ground for the decision
was United States v. McCormick.29 In that case the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that, absent a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, seizure of a vehicle for impoundment purposes must be
authorized by warrant.
The defendant in McCormick was apprehended at his home by
Secret Service agents acting under authority of an arrest warrant. When
the agents arrived, they parked in the driveway of the house, effectively
blocking any means of exit for McCormick's car. The car was impounded, and a later search turned up a photographic negative of a
treasury seal. Use of the photographic negative as evidence contributed
to the conviction of the defendant for conspiracy to counterfeit Federal
Reserve notes.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. Its
decision conceded that, had the initial seizure of the car been valid, the
later search would also have been valid. 30 The court reasoned, however,
that "the Fourth Amendment applies equally to searches and to seizures.''31 Thus whatever rules govern the validity of searches are applicable to seizures. The most basic rule in the area is that, subject to
certain specific and well-defined exceptions, any search or seizure made
2
without the prior issuance of a warrant is per se unreasonable.3
The government attempted to justify the warrantless impoundment
in McCormick by asserting that the forfeiture statute under which the
car was seized obviated the warrant requirement.3 No attempt was
made to rationalize the seizure as a protective measure, although the
court did not intimate that such a rationale would be insufficient.

29. 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974).
30. Id. at 284.
31. Id. at 285.
32. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Haile v. Gardner, 91 So. 376 (Fla. 1921); State v. Williams,
227 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
33. 502 F.2d at 283. 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1970) provides that any vehicle used to conceal
or transport contraband "shall be seized and forfeited." The imperative nature of the
language in § 782 could arguably be taken to mean that Congress intended that such
vehicles could be seized without a warrant. It is this interpretation that the McCormick
court rejected.
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Rather, the court rejected the idea that an " 'Act of Congress can
authorize a violation of the Constitution.' "34
Since the statute could not obviate the need for a warrant, it was
necessary for the court to determine whether any of the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement could uphold the seizure. The
"plain view" exception, which allows the warrantless seizure by the
police of evidence or contraband which is in plain view, was dismissed
on authority of Coolidge v. New Hampshire;35 in McCormick the
police knew beforehand of the existence of the car and its prior illegal
use, and therefore had opportunity to obtain a warrant.3 6 The search
of the car independent of its seizure could not qualify as a search incident to a valid arrest under the rules laid down in Chimel v. California3 7 because McCormick was arrested in his house, and the car was
not "' "within his immediate control"-construing that phrase to mean
the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.' "38
Finally, the so-called "automobile exception" first articulated in
Carroll v. United States 9 was held inapplicable to the McCormick
seizure. Transplanting the Carroll search principles to a seizure situation, the McCormick court concluded that a warrantless seizure conducted pursuant to a forfeiture statute falls within the automobile exception only if (1) there is probable cause to believe the automobile
contains contraband; and (2) exigent circumstances 40exist that make it
impractical to secure a warrant prior to the seizure.
The situation confronted by the McCormick court differed materially from the exigent circumstances that have justified application
of the automobile exception. In Carroll exigent circumstances were
held to exist because the automobile could be driven from the jurisdiction while a warrant was being procured. 41 In McCormick the car was
34. 502 F.2d at 286, quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
35. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Coolidge limited the "plain view" doctrine to instances
where a police officer comes "inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused." Id. at 466. Thus in Coolidge and McCormick, both cases in which the police
knew of the prior illegal use of a car and also its description, the fact that the car was
in plain view could justify neither its seizure nor search.
36. 502 F.2d at 288.
37. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
38. 502 F.2d at 286, quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
39. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
40. 502 F.2d at 287.
41. 267 US. at 153.
Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause
serve as a sufficient authorization for a search. Carroll . . . holds a search warrant
unnecessary where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the
highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may
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legally parked and was actually prevented from being moved. Although
there was probable cause to believe that the car had been used to
transport contraband, and therefore was subject to the statutory seizure
provisions,42 the court held that no exigency existed sufficient to justify
warrantless impoundment.4 Since the car was stationary and driverless,
the police would have been at no disadvantage if required to obtain a
warrant prior to the seizure.
On its facts, 1972 Porsche is quite similar to McCormick. Both cases
involved warrantless impoundment and search of a vehicle that was
legally parked and unoccupied at the time of the owner's arrest. Application of the McCormick probable cause-exigent circumstances test
by the 1972 Porsche court may suggest that the exceptions to the warrant requirement examined in McCormick are exclusive. Such an inference is inappropriate. 4 The McCormick principle applied in 1972
Porsche should be viewed as an application of the emerging Florida
rule that warrantless impoundment is permissible only when necessary
under the circumstances. In State v. Volk,45 the Second District Court
of Appeal affirmed the suppression of evidence discovered in an inventory because there was no necessity for impounding the vehicle and
the police did so contrary to their usual procedure. Similarly, an Attorney General's opinion has indicated that an inventory search predicated on a warrantless impoundment is justifiable only when such
circumstances as the likelihood of vandalism or theft make the impoundment necessary."6
In 1972 Porsche, there were three grounds on which it could be
argued warrantless impoundment was necessary. First, the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act authorizes the
seizure and forfeiture of vehicles used in violation of drug laws.4 T The
Act empowers law enforcement agencies to authorize officers to make
such seizures, and directs any officer so authorized, "whenever he shall
discover any ... vehicle ...

which has been or is being used in viola-

never be found again if a warrant must be obtained. Hence an immediate search
is consitutionally permissible.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
42. 502 F.2d at 287.
43. Id. The chief underpinning for the rationale of McCormick is Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), which condemned the use of evidence found in the
search of a parked and unoccupied car. See also O'Berry v. Wainwright, 394 F. Supp. 591

(S.D. Fla. 1975).
44.
45.
46.
47.

See text accompanying notes 54-57 infra.
291 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
1973 FLA. Arr'Y GEN. Op. 073-43, at 2.
FLA. STAT. § 893.12(2) (1973), as amended, FLA. STAT. § 893.12(2) (Supp. 1974). See
FLA. STAT. § 943.43 (Supp. 1974).
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tion of any of the provisions of this chapter .... to seize such ... vehicle." ' 48 McCormick makes it clear that directory provisions of such
statutes do not constitute an independent exception to the warrant requirement; statutory directives in themselves are insufficient to establish the necessity of a warrantless seizure.
Secondly, it could be argued that a warrantless impoundment is
necessary if required by routine police procedure. Though such an
argument makes it possible to distinguish the Volk case, it is untenable
in light of the McCormick holding with regard to statutes requiring
seizures.
Thirdly, it could be argued that warrantless impoundment is necessary for protective purposes. Most Florida cases upholding inventory
searches fit into this category rather than the McCormick probable
cause-exigent circumstances test. With exceptions, 49 the Florida cases
upholding inventory searches typically involve the arrest of a driver for
a traffic offense of such a serious character that he must go with the
police to post bond. Rather than abandon the car at the side of the
road, the police impound the car, tow it from the scene and conduct an
inventory. 50 The impoundment may thereby protect the owner's property from damage or theft.5 1 In 1972 Porsche, the court rejected as
"legally insufficient" the State's attempt to justify its impoundment
procedure as a matter of police self-protection.52 Though the court's
language might be read to suggest an outright rejection of any pro48. FLA. STAT. § 893.12(3) (1973), as amended, FLA. STAT. § 893.12(3) (Supp. 1974).
49. In Godbee v. State, 224 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969), the suspect was
apprehended by the police, but fled on foot, leaving his car illegally parked on a sidewalk. The vehicle was impounded and an inventory taken that disclosed a cache of
stolen weapons. In State v. Cash, 275 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973), a motel
owner reported a trespasser. Police arrested the man and were informed by the motel
owner that the alleged trespasser had a car on the motel premises. The motel owner then
asked the police to tow the car away. The Cash court held that the ensuing inventory
search was reasonable, but did not consider whether the underlying warrantless impoundment was proper. On similar facts, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, noting that
the police had no basis for impounding the car, held the ensuing inventory was an unreasonable search. United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 471 (8th Cir. 1973), cited with
approval in State v. Volk, 291 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
50. See State v. Galloway, 266 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Urquhart v.
State, 261 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied, 266 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1972);
State v. Ruggles, 245 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971). Note that in each of these
cases the inventory was made after the impoundment decision but before the car was
moved. The order of events is immaterial; the crucial factor is that the inventory is made
pursuant to impoundment.
51. Most Florida inventory cases have addressed themselves to the validity of the inventory search rather than the validity of the underlying impoundment. See note 25 supra.
Thus the case law has not explored the issue of whether protective principles justify impoundment as well as the related inventory.
52. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
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tective impoundment rationale, it is more likely to mean that a distinction will be drawn between impoundments carried out to protect the
police and those carried out to protect owners' property. 53 Volk, however, suggests that a bare claim that impoundment is motivated by the
desire to protect the owner is not dispositive; if circumstances indicate
such "protection" is unnecessary the impoundment is inappropriatealthough protective principles would make an inventory necessary once
the vehicle is lawfully impounded.
Even where warrantless impoundment is not required to protect
the owner's property, it may be justified if necessary to protect the
public. Subsequent to McCormick, the Ninth Circuit in Cardenas v.
Pitchess54 upheld an impoundment on such grounds. The Cardenas
suspects, arrested for disturbing the peace, were known members of a
Cuban Power group suspected of a series of bombings. Their car contained a pistol in plain view. In upholding use of the evidence discovered in an inventory search, the court maintained the impoundment-inventory distinction drawn in McCormick, but recognized an
exception to the warrant requirement not discussed in that case. The
Cardenas court held, "Protection of the public justified the impoundment, and protection of both petitioner's property and the safety of the
police officers justified the inventory."' There are a variety of situations
in which public protection may necessitate impoundment. For instance,
an illegally parked 56 or disabled vehicle may pose a threat to traffic, or
53. As a practical matter, a police need for self-protection-either from destructive
devices contained in the car or from false charges of police theft-does not arise unless
the police take possession of and assume responsibility for the car. The owner's need for
protection, however, exists whether or not the police take custody. If his property is
endangered, impoundment may be necessary to protect it. Once it has been impounded,
the inventory helps protect his property from dishonest custodians. Cf. text accompanying
note 55 infra.
54. 506 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1974).
55. Id. at 1226 (emphasis added). See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973):
In Harris the justification for the initial intrusion into the vehicle was to safeguard the owner's property, and in Cooper it was to guarantee the safety of the
custodians. Here the justification, while different, was as immediate and constitutionally reasonable as those in Harris and Cooper: concern for the safety of the
general public who might be endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from
the trunk of the vehicle.
56. E.g., cases cited note 49 supra. In situations where an illegally parked or disabled
car poses no immediate threat to the public and is unlikely to be damaged or vandalized,
it seems reasonable to require a warrant for its impoundment. See text at p. 454 infra.
However, in State v. Volk, 291 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), the court noted it
had upheld inventory searches "in cases in which an automobile has been necessarily impounded after abandonment." Id. at 644. That statement referred, id. at n.l, to Godbee v.
State, 224 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969), in which the driver abandoned his car
on the public sidewalk after eluding arresting officers. The Volk dicta thus may not mean
that abandonment per se necessitates warrantless impoundment. But dicta in Cady v.
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it may be necessary to prevent an inebriated driver from continuing to
pilot his car at the peril of himself and others.5 1 In such cases the central factual issues are identical to those posed in other protective impoundment situations: was protection required, and was impoundment
8
necessary to achieve that protection?
If the answers to the foregoing questions are affirmative, 1972
Porsche and McCormick suggest a further question must be asked: was
there a legal basis for warrantless impoundment? Because McCormick
explicitly recognizes that impoundment constitutes a seizure, and 1972
Porsche impliedly accepts that holding, it follows that a warrant is
normally required to impound property. Although both cases involved
impoundments authorized by forfeiture statutes, it makes little sense to
limit the cases to those facts. If impoundment constitutes a seizure
when carried out for forfeiture purposes, it should also be regarded as
a seizure when carried out for protective purposes. Thus warrantless
impoundment should be permissible only if it falls within a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement.
The exception most frequently applicable to impoundment is that
recognized in Carroll-the existence of special circumstances that make
it "not practicable to obtain a warrant." 59 By analogy to Carroll and
McCormick, the courts could hold that, absent other applicable exceptions, warrantless impoundment is permissible only if (1) the police
have probable cause to believe impoundment is necessary to protect
the public or to protect the owner's property from theft or damage;
and (2) procuring a warrant is impracticable because damage to the
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973), quoted in note 25 supra, suggests that abandoned
vehicles constitute a nuisance, and that it is not unreasonable for police to tow away such
vehicles without a warrant. Cf. United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973),
where the court distinguished inventory searches of cars parked on private property from
inventories of cars left beside the road, noting inter alia that the latter category constitutes
"a nuisance along the highway." Id. at 471.
57. "We have upheld inventory searches in cases in which an automobile has been
necessarily impounded . . . where its sole occupant is, because of intoxication, unfit to
drive." State v. Volk, 291 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974 ) (emphasis added),
citing Urquhart v. State, 261 So. 2d 535, 536 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971). In Urquhart,
Judge Mann noted in concurrence, "The practice of removing to a safe place, under the
control of a safe driver, every vehicle from which its drinking driver is parted by the
police is sound." 261 So. 2d at 536.
The quoted language suggests the Second District might invalidate as unnecessary an
automobile impoundment made when a sober driver other than a police officer was
available. Cf. note 58 infra.
58. Factors relevant to the necessity requirement are discussed in United States v.
Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1973); Urquhart v. State, 261 So. 2d 535, 538 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (Mann, J., concurring in denial of rehearing). Cf. Mozzetti v.
Superior Ct., 484 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1971).
59. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
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public or damage or theft of the owner's property is likely to occur
while a warrant is being procured.
Where impoundment is predicated on public protection, the second
branch of the proposed test would usually be met. If a danger to the
public exists, it is likely to be immediate. 60 But where impoundment is
undertaken to protect the owner, delaying impoundment until a warrant is obtained will often be practicable. Where an automobile is
legally parked in a business district during daylight hours, for instance, it may well be possible to obtain a warrant before the threat to
the owner's property becomes significant.
If the above tests had been applied in 1972 Porsche, the court could
have reached its result on either of two grounds. First, it could have
reasoned that impoundment was unnecessary per se. Since the car was
legally parked in a residential neighborhood, the court could have concluded the police had no basis for believing the car posed a threat to
the public or was likely to attract thieves or vandals. Secondly, the
court could have concluded that under the circumstances theft or
damage was likely to occur only if the car were left in the neighborhood for an extended period. Therefore, the court could have reasoned,
there was no exigency sufficient to dispense with the warrant requirement.
The 1972 Porsche court, of course, did not go so far. At most, the
ambiguous opinion indicates that impoundment is a seizure subject to
fourth amendment requirements, and that a bare claim of police selfprotection does not create an exception to those requirements. But if
Florida courts pursue the rationale of McCormick in subsequent cases,
they may succeed in making impoundment and inventory procedures
consistent with other search and seizure law.
MICHAEL P. MABILE
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RuLE.-State v. Roman, 309 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Two armed plainclothes police officers accompanied by an unarmed
police cadet went to a college dormitory to execute search warrants
and capiases on two students. Unable to find the students, the officers
enlisted the aid of defendant Mark Roman. The officers did not inform
60. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Cardenas v. Pitchess, 506 F.2d
1224 (9th Cir. 1974). In each case the danger to the public was that a weapon contained
in the car might fall into the wrong hands if not quickly recovered by police officers.

